James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan

James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War, 2009.

James Mann's 2004 Rise of the Vulcans placed him as one of the leading popular voices covering recent American foreign relations history, and Mann's Rebellion continues the trend. In Rebellion Mann argues that Ronald Reagan bucked traditional conservative thinking on Gorbachev and the state of the Soviet Union, and helped end the Cold War. Instead of viewing Gorbachev through the doctrinaire prism of a velvet glove hiding a steel fist ready to crush capitalism and democracy, Dutch realized Gorbachev's fundamental desire to initiate true reform on several fronts, which permitted Gorbachev to enact perestroika and glasnost. Ultimately, Mann concludes:

"Reagan didn't win the Cold War; Gorbachev abandoned it. By recognizing Gorbachev's significance, when many others in the US did not, Reagan helped create the climate in which the Cold War could end." (346)

Mann lays out the challenges Reagan faced internationally and from within the US, including his own dogmatic anti-communism. At points, the book reads like a greatest hits of the Reagan presidency, skipping through the well-worn narrative of events and speeches. The chapters are short and portray events through a speedy, episodic chronology, but the brief nature also tends to increase repitition until parts III and IV. In orther words, the first half is breezy.

That's not to say that the book isn't without substance. Mann goes a long way in debunking the Republican and conservative mythology surrounding Reagan. Mann portrays Dutch as a simple person: a man influenced by his wife; a president who grasped larger ideas but lacked any interest in nuance; and one who made mistakes and gaffes, especially as Alzheimer's Disease reared its head in the final year (or years) of his presidency. The romantic idea of "Reagan" as the Republican paragon is crucial for the Republican Party. Don't get me wrong, Dutch played an important role in demolishing the New Deal alignment of political loyalties and altering how people talked about the place of government, even if their actions didn't mirror rhetoric. (I think that's one of the most valuable legacies of Reagan's presidency, altering the language of the debate on government.) Of course, he didn't shrink government, he exploded the US deficit, and, after seeing the effect of his tax cuts, raised taxes to compensate for his budgets. But if you have any doubts about Reagan's symbolic importance, revisit the imagery and discussion during the 2008 Republican primary and general election campaign.

I learned more about the interaction between Reagan, Nixon, and Kissinger than I knew before, but it points to my strongest criticism. Nixon visited Reagan and sent him letters as Reagan sought the ashamed president's approval for his foreign policy. The Soviets also contacted Nixon for advice on how they should deal with Reagan. Mann uses the interactions with Nixon to symbolize how rebellious Reagan's interactions with Gorbachev were. In many ways, the difference of opinion--continuing throughout Reagan's shift in favor of Gorbachev--serves as the vehicle by which Mann characterizes Republican thinking on the Soviet Union. This, however, is problematic. Mann offers sprinklings of opposition from Buckley, Will, Safire, and the WSJ, but I'm left wondering how "rebellious" Reagan's policy was from mainstream thought? Intellectually, I grasp Mann's point, however, I don't know how well it holds up to the historical record or basic critique. Presidents working with their Soviet counterparts wasn't revolutionary. (See Jeremy Suri's Power and Protest on this point.)

Additionally, how can you be an upstart if you're opposing Nixon but refusing to acknowledge his presence and keeping your meetings and communications entirely secret due to the stigma attached to the shamed ex-president? What was Reagan rejecting? Nixon's and Kissinger's detente? Reagan ran against detente and purposely avoided any language that linked his actions to detente, which was widely unpopular by 1980. So what or who is he rebelling against? Overall, I think Mann exaggerates Reagan's rejection of Cold War orthodoxy, especially since Reagan symbolized it for decades before 1980. (Thanks for the input, Doug.) Finally, the issue of evolution in Reagan's thinking is skimpy and seems forced in Mann's hurry to paint Reagan as rebellious.

Regarding the latter points, Mann wrote the book for a popular audience. A scholarly study of this sort would need to factor in public opinion, congressional opposition, and influence of world leaders. Mann includes some congressional opposition to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987 and 1988. The focus is on Reagan, but Gorbachev occassionaly seems like a side player or someone who reacts to Reagan's initiatives rather than an agent of his own. I find that treatment odd considering the sub-title and the prominence Mann awards Gorbachev for ending the Cold War. Nevertheless, for a popular audience the book isn't bad. It offers factual interpretations (instead of "REAGAN WON THE COLD WAR" mythology), the writing is lucid, and Mann provides a conceptual framework that popular historians have largely eschewed.