Showing posts with label Books. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Books. Show all posts

Saturday, May 8, 2010

Joyce Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism [Kicking Ass]




Joyce Appleby, emeritus historian at UCLA, tackles a mammoth subject with a history of capitalism, and she treats it well in the 436 pages. She tries to restore contingency and insert culture into the rise of capitalism with the logic that "capitalism is a cultural force and not simply an economic one, it cannot be explained by material factors alone" and a capitalist culture could ascend only after wearing down pre-existing/medieval norms pertaining to commerce, land use, and social relations (26). In arguing this cultural and contingent interpretation, she dispatches, to varying degrees, three titans: Smith, Marx, Weber. What follows is a thorough explanation of how capitalism ingrained itself and triumphed by adaption to whatever circumstances arose as it shifted from its origin in England to the US and, one presumes based on the final chapter, China.

England's agricultural revolution--while not necessarily a direct antecedent to its more famous industrial cousin--altered society in a crucial manner by boosting harvests, detaching families from the land (sending them across the seas and itinerantly chasing labor in England), commercializing land, and producing wage labor with an attendant and subsequent appearance of consumption as a robust form of economic activity. From that initial burst, capitalism speedily conquered medieval forms of intellectual, social, and cultural stratification within England that stood as a roadblocks to its dominance. The United States and a unified Germany slid into place when England's capitalist star dimmed, with the American form exploding in a super nova that positioned it as the world's leader before World War I and piloted the unknown growth from the 1950s until stagflation signaled its death in the 1970s. After 1975, she enters mushy territory and powers through much of the 1980s to preach the gospel of the internet and globalization before wrapping it up in hurried fashion with a description of China and India. I presume she tacked on the final chapter "Of Crises and Critics" as an afterthought when the house nearly folded in 2008.

I skimmed a couple of reviews that credited her for a balanced approach that grants equal time to proponents and antagonists alike all the while shedding a triumphalist tack. That's not the book I read. In fact, it celebrates capitalism and its innovators without dwelling on those who stagger under its weight without benefiting from its liberation. Then why, you might ask, do Americans cling to this economic system? In her words, "the American public has resoundingly supported capitalism and its demands on society in part because they have not been exposed to the withering commentary of critics" (311). I would agree with that statement, and bolster it by saying that works such as Relentless Revolution contribute to that trend by neglecting capitalism's critics by portraying a flowery history that precipitated national greatness.

I wanted to like this book and spent far too much time reading it closely. The book closes with two pages answering my questions in cursory fashion on capitalism and democracy, its own inherent democratizing tendencies, or it as an economic and cultural system. I would have enjoyed a bit of theorizing on capitalism in place of the oft encyclopedic chronicling, and I cannot rip Appleby too hard for not writing the book I desired when it wasn't her intention. I am, however, able to target her cheerleading of capitalism and its adherents and innovators. Relentless Revolution would have been better had she explored the duality of capitalism (especially during and after American capitalism's efflorescence in the mid-twentieth century) that provides opportunity and pitfalls instead of dry descriptions of currency, financial innovation, and similar tedious insight into the levers of capitalism.

Appleby made one mistake between that caught my eye, even though I'm sure there are more buried in the text. It's Thorstein Veblen, not Thornstein Veblen, and the quote that follows on 188 is mistakenly attributed to Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy in the end notes and not Veblen's Theory of Business Enterprise. In fairness to her, writing 436 pages is a task that most people could not accomplish and mistakes are bound to result.

Appleby's narrative is well known but written with accessible prose, even though it elides the negatives in favor of a sunny retelling. I'm glad I finished the book and I appreciate her infusion of contingency and culture into this discussion. Would I recommend it to friends? Most likely not.

Saturday, April 17, 2010

Listening is an Act of Love

Dave Isay, ed., Listening is an Act of Love: A Celebration of American Life from the Storycorps Project.

Thanks to my mother-in-law, we received a copy of Listening is an Act of Love recently. At first blush I was unfamiliar with the book's contents and the NPR program. I don't drive often and I'm nervously connecting my ipod once I am buckled in rather than skipping around the radio pre-sets and settling on NPR. I can almost hear the gasps dripping with condescension "you don't listen to NPR and have this committed to memory?!?!" Despite that, the stories contained within Listening is an Act of Love reached my ear during the fleeting instances when I kept vigil at 90.1 FM, and I was pleasantly surprised that I had absorbed more of these vignettes than I previously thought.

The Storycorps Project is a stunning endeavor that recorded memories that run the emotional gamut from stirring to joyous to painful. Dave Isay edited a plethora of stories that range in quality and duration. He winnowed them into a tidy 270 pages based around five thematic chapters: Home and Family, Work and Dedication, Journeys, History and Struggle, Fire and Water. The book is, as the subtitle claims, a celebration of American life in all of its manifestations, be they ugly or verdant.

The subjects volunteered their time and recollections in traveling and fixed recording booths across the US that digitally captured an exchange between the subject and a facilitator or friend/loved one. The Library of Congress' American Folklife Center houses the Storycorps' recordings, along with a catalog of inestimable value and depth. Oral history, one could contend, is an example of appreciation for an oral tradition whose sinews connect us to our earliest ancestors and their transmission of history. From the WPA interviews to contemporary projects such as the Storycorps, Americans largely celebrate oral history and Listening is an Act of Love taps into this desire with aplomb. The stories are so disparate that they defy a simple review that I would compose in this space.

I walked away from Listening is an Act of Love with an improved appreciation for oral history as a methodological tool that charts the obstacles faced in every day life and the strategies employed to overcome the peaks and valleys. After wrapping up "Fire and Water," the final chapter covering 9/11 and Katrina, I reconsidered the lens by which I interpreted the first decade of this century for Americans. With the September 11 attacks, Katrina, and the colossal failure of the US' financial and economic system, the decade consisted of bookends and a meaty center where ruin was heaped on the United States with an attendant social cost that will be reckoned with for the subsequent decade or longer. Americans will persist and slog through the ruptures we face, and Listening is an Act of Love reinforces the durability of Americans and, possibly, a nebulous American spirit. After the past year, I'm sick of partisanship and empty-headed screeds warning of communism and socialism, and possibly these nuisances are the product of the shocks from '01-'09. I remain positive in spite of the apoplectic, frothing displays that the US will rebuild a foundation of rational centrist approaches to regulation and taxes, and that politicians will forsake short-term political gain to join a discussion of how to safeguard our country. I trust that a toxic political conversation abates in the near future. If the missives in Listening is an Act of Love reveal anything, it's the ability for Americans to harness renewal and hope to rebuild.

Friday, January 29, 2010

Neil MacFarquhar, The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You A Happy Birthday


Neil MacFarquhar's 2008 The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You A Happy Birthday: Unexpected Encounters in the Changing Middle East is a fun jaunt through the contemporary Middle East. MacFarquhar grew up in Libya on an Esso oil company compound before Qaddafi and his eccentricities seized power and booted the Americans. After a fairly elite upbringing--attending Deerfield and Stanford--he was an AP and NYT correspondent in the Middle East mastering Arabic and sloshing around the region encountering Islamists, the Ikhwan, mukhabarat, and men and women yearning for reform and openness. The 359 pages of text delve into a host of topics, even though Israel-Palestine, Algeria, and a few other countries are absent from his narrative. Even though it's a mouthful, the title is one of my favorites besides Brad Simpson's Economists with Guns detailing a sordid relationship between Indonesia and US development machinations and experts.

This isn't a conventional scholarly book and, as such, it's difficult to review its chapters apart from their journalistic bent. I'm impressed with MacFarquhar's ability to marry anecdotes and interviews with trenchant criticism. He relegates the bulk of his pique to the repressive regimes in the Middle East and the young leaders whose initial burst of promise faded rapidly and was replaced with the iron fist of the state, even if it was wrapped in a new, softer velvet glove. With contacts across the region, he stocked the book with revelatory chapters that portray a vibrant amalgam of people who seek the chance to provide opportunity to women, poor, and the working-class.

All of this serves another purpose in his epilogue, where he offers policy prescriptions to improve America's poor standing in most Arab speaking countries. Among several meaningful suggestions, one of the most salient is his encouragement for Americans to listen to the people he depicts, for they offer keys to grasping the intricacies of each country's unique challenges and hope for the future. In fact, he rejects the idea that technology's rosy potential isn't the US' greatest trait to share. On the last page he states "I would argue that there is an even more powerful export that has been uniquely American for decades. It is an export that no other country has been able to duplicate, and cheap knock-offs just don't exist. That export is hope" (359). If there was a contest, "hope" could win in spades as the single over-used word in 2008.

As I read the book, my mind drifted to an annoyance I've had with speaking on the contemporary Middle East among scholars, graduate students, or those who shun facile stereotypes. They are gun shy when the question shifts to criticizing Islam, Muslims, or regimes in the Middle East. I'm guilty of hemming and hawing when this topic arises, more often than not in reply to someone who proposes an essentialist vision of Islam as repressive, backwards, totalizing, and ancient. It's difficult to strike a balance when discussions meander toward Islam, terrorism, or foreign policy. Most people can't appreciate nuance, won't commit to understanding the faith, and are willing to generalize when it comes to Muslims from Morocco to Malaysia. The fact of the matter, as MacFarquhar points out, is that some people use Islam to preach a message of intolerance that enables or is manipulated to justify repression. One could easily retort with questions of normative behavior, Western cultural mores, Horky and Adorno, etc. One of MacFarquhar's strengths lies in his even-handed resolution to this dilemma by distancing Islam as the thorn in the side of development or freedom while still pointing out that it can be and is fashioned to oppress. Yet the faith also instills confidence in its adherents that an alternate, equitable vision of the future and society is feasible.

All in all, it's a fun book to read that opens a door to a Middle East that I don't know. Unlike hacks writing on the state of the region and directions for US foreign policy, he speaks Arabic fluently and has a insightful awareness of social and cultural currents across a wide spectrum of countries. There are a couple of chapters that an editor could have eviscerated. Despite its length and few a throw-away chapters, it's an impressive account and worth reading if you're inspired by human rights or desire to grasp the modern Middle East outside of the media drum beat of war, intolerance, and terrorism.

Monday, January 18, 2010

Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA's Seventy Year Quest for Cheap Labor


If you're looking for a work that weaves transnational history and theoretical inquiries, you've come to the right place. Jefferson Cowie revised his North Carolina dissertation into a fantastic book. Under the direction of Leon Fink, Cowie wrote a dissertation that became an intriguing work of history that is emblematic of the new methodological directions occurring in the field. Starting in Camden and wrapping up in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, RCA loaded up the family and moved to...well, certainly not Beverly, but in search of cheap, docile laborers. In each spot, however, RCA discovered that unions and workers' demands for fair treatment (ie, dignity) cut into their profits and production over the course of seventy years of boom and bust. RCA settled in Ciudad Juarez where ample labor pools of young women, pliable unions, and state sponsorship awaited their shiny, new TV factories.

Capital Moves is a book worth emulating. Cowie speaks Spanish and utilizes Spanish language materials, drew upon approximately forty interviews (in-person and via archival collections), and bridged disciplinary bounds to fashion a concise chronological narrative, all in the space of 210 pages. Rejecting the concept of labor peace between capital and unions after World War II, he reveals how RCA consistently sought to undermine solidarity and boost its profits through the pursuit of low-cost labor. In other words, the concept of a corporatist utopia is in doubt. Cowie states "most historians date the disintegration of the pact [between labor and capital] in the mid-1970s or beyond, but RCA's plant location decisions in the 1930s and 1940s suggest that management may have been significantly less committed to its end of the bargain than many analysts presume" (6). RCA moved south and, along the way, nurtured communities and a sense of culture, which is one of the author's strong contributions.

In the acknowledgments, Cowie thanks Fink for allowing him to cross disciplines in his dissertation, and historians should be grateful he did. Geographers, along with anthropologists, are producing exciting work, and Cowie hints at their ideas throughout the book and their influence is on full display in chapter seven, "The Distances in Between," where he examines the concept of community, place, space, and the influence on solidarity. In addition to Karl Marx and Pierre Bourdieu, georgraphers Gordon Clark, David Harvey, Edward Soja, Michael Storper, and Richard Walker appear as he charts what RCA's southward march meant for those along its path. Fascinating stuff, and content you won't find among most labor historians or, for that matter, historians.

I think Cowie's introduction could have benefited from a discussion of neoliberalism and its derivates. As it stands, he peppers the chapters with the term and concept without delving into any of its roots. Thus it seems divorced from the broader conversation of it as an economic policy with considerable social and cultural ramifications. One could rebut this criticism with the standard "he's writing for specialists who know this scholarly terrain." But do they? I would wager a bet that a fair proportion of historians are unfamiliar with Harvey, who is the most prominent of neoliberal scholars, or neoliberalism's manifestations. Certainly some are fluent in this matter or at least cognizant, however, I think the book could have been on stronger footing had he broached the concept at the onset.

A related criticism stems from the focus on Latin America, and this isn't a pointed criticism of Cowie per se. I don't understand labor historians' preoccupation with Latin America. Jana Lippman, Julie Greene, Cowie, Fink, Beth McKillen, and Dana Frank wrote fantastic scholarship that is a credit to their subfield. Regardless, I am stumped for an answer when I ponder the effect or intention of this geographic focus. It was once related to me that some Latin Americanists view this attention with skepticism and question if it's another example of American(ist) hegemony in academia. I'm not qualified to venture into this territory, so I'll abstain from wading into this topic.

These criticisms notwithstanding, I think Cowie wrote an impressive book that well deserved the 1999 Philip Taft Labor History Prize. Chapter seven is an intellectual contribution--along with the book as a whole--and historians could do well to tackle the issues he raises and integrate his interdisciplinary approach in future works. In other words, a sterling example of history that is readable and intellectually compelling.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Julie Greene, The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal

As I mentioned in a previous post, I intended to bring Julie Greene's book, The Canal Builders, with me to Morocco. A friend's advice and limited space merged, resulting with the book sleeping on my shelf until I returned. Julie taught at CU and trained me to appreciate and strive for transnational and international history. She led a readings and research class in comparative labor history and labor history, respectively, and was one of my PhD oral examiners. Now that the caveats are out of the way....

The Canal Builders provides, at a basic level, a detailed examination of those who built the canal. However, that description simplifies her impressive accomplishment. In reality, the subject is those who constructed the literal and metaphorical world of the canal and the canal zone--from the imperious director, George Goethals, to West Indian laborers to Progressive Gertrude Beeks. An underlying concept Greene employs is that of "boundaries." She charts the boundaries produced and traversed by the white Americans (those on the higher gold pay scale), the mass of non-white or non-American laborers (those on the lesser silver wage rate), women who accompanied their husbands to the canal zone, Panamanians, American military officials, and hosts of workers and civilians who inhabited the conflicted imperial project. It was in the world of imperial, transnational, and gendered boundaries that construction transpired, and an imperial project thrived.

The book clocks in at 388 pages of text (with impressive notes following) and is filled with anecdotes from the above listed groups of actors. Greene weaves the rich, diverse voices with a narrative that interrogates and illuminates the processes of building the physical as well as social and cultural canal and canal zone. She rescues the stories of those who traveled far and wide (ranging from American steam shovel operators to Indians and Chinese) and who survived the perils of building the Panama Canal and the task of living under the Goethals' repressive regime that hurdled toward a singular pursuit: maximize labor output to complete construction; all resources diverted to build the canal. Although I skimmed the book quickly, I did not detect any gross repetitions of the anecdotes, which is a common error when an author employs this methodological approach. For instance, rather than repeat a story that would illustrate her point, she acknowledged its previous usage without retreading the same ground. I found that chapters two, "As I am a True American," and three, "Silver Lives," best display her research and analytical focus, as well as the human element of segregation and racism present in the canal. Also owing to her expert as a labor historian, chapters two and three explicated the labor dimension as well as the struggles to control and express labor rights.

What would a review be without criticism? The Canal Builders is a feat of research and writing, and does not suffer from the near tedium of Peter Way's Common Labor: Workers and the Digging of the North American Canals, 1780-1860. Still, canal building for 388 pages can be a tad long, even though the subjects shift and Greene avoids redundancies and dwelling upon one particular group. My principal complaint centers on Goethals' and others' aspiration. That is, the grander story of the canal's progress is oddly absent. In fact, until the final chapter, "Hercules Comes Home," the canal and steps in the direction of the Pacific float in a distant ether. The simple rebuttal is that David McCullough's book The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914, among others, recite the much-ballyhooed paths of the American ascendancy and triumph in Panama. Regardless, brief synopses of the chronological advances through the jungle could have supplied her narrative and the thematic chapters with a sense of cohesion. With that said, the complaint is minor for such a solid work of history.

The Panama Canal continues to be a stunning engineering and logistical feat. Greene's book eviscerates the easy narrative that romanticizes the intrepid rising imperial power's conquest of nature and geography. A model of transnational, labor, and foreign relations history, The Canal Builders reveals the messy steps and missteps that occurred in Panama, itself a product of US imperialism, as Goethals and workers from across the globe drove to the Pacific.

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Travel Reading for Morocco

I have eleven days before I depart. I have a laundry list of tasks that await completion before I leave. Fortunately, I have picked my books and most are resting on my bookshelf. So that's one less bump. Here is the list:

Julie Greene, The Canal Builders
Michael Chabon, The Yiddish Policemen's Union
Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell To Arms
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things An Archaeology of the Human Sciences
David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity
Mel Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The US, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War

Some of these I've started, skimmed, or wanted to tackle for quite a while. In addition to those six, I have my Lonely Planet Morocco book and a few more Arabic instructional books. For six weeks, they should keep me occupied.

Monday, October 19, 2009

Vonnegut's New Collection of Short Stories: Look at the Birdie

Kurt Vonnegut's second posthumous work, Look at the Birdie, is slated to appear on bookshelves soon. It is a collection of short stories from KV's career, and I believe they were composed early in his career. Armageddon in Retrospect was a bit of a disappointment as the stories seemed hurriedly assembled to coincide with the market for his material following his death. While I know I cannot expect Monkey House with every collection, I'm a bit more hopeful for Birdie. "Look at the Birdie," the title story, is offered for free via the LAT. The sly, artful use of language is present and the story ends in typical Vonnegut fashion after odd twists and turns with a conclusion that neither settles nor awards.

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Ayn Rand Bio

The New Republic's senior editor Jon Chait assessed a recent biography of Ayn Rand, titled Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right by Jennifer Burns. I'd be lying if I claimed that the article was an honest book review rather than describing it more accurately as a third review, a third attack on Rand, and a third editorial on the hysteria of conservatives over tax matters and governance. With that being said, Wealthcare is a fantastic yet long read that exposes Rand's vicious, imperious personality and how her ideas took hold in modern conservatism. Her acolytes adopted a cultish following where Rand wielded a totalitarian-esque cudgel within the group that demanded strict adherence to her writings and thoughts as well as unflinching loyalty to her as a person. Excommunications and personal attacks followed those who committed minor transgressions or questioned her will. All in all, a fascinating article with, for me, agreeable commentary on how the right's concern on taxes for the rich is unfounded. I'm tempted to purchase the book for my trip, but I'm uncertain if I need additional history luggage.

Monday, October 5, 2009

John Perkins' Confessions of an Economic Hit Man and the Secret History of The American Empire




















Shortly after they were published, I wanted to read John Perkins' books recounting his past as an economic hit man. We flew to Rhode Island for a wedding this weekend, and I took the opportunity to check the books out from the DPL. Confessions (2004) and Secret History (2007) offer insight into Perkins' past as an economic hit man. In short, he believes that the NSA or another shadowy government organization guaranteed his employment and training to build an economic empire for the US and to create massive networks of debt and economic subservience for the third world. In fact, the latter is not difficult to believe. I question whether he received some form of government training through a mysterious, vanishing woman named Claudine. To me, it strains credulity and introduces a conspiratorial element that I doubt and he cannot support outside of his reminiscences.

As I read Confessions, I kept thinking of James Frey's A Million Little Pieces. I do not question if Perkins participated in a process of economic warfare for private sector gain, rather if he received orders to carry the weight of empire building. Could he realize it well after the fact and express remorse for his actions? Certainly, and it appears that one of his motives for writing the book was to expose the sordid tale of American economic policies since the 1970s that produced little wealth for few except those in key positions in the private sector.

After reading Confessions, I was curious if Secret History departed from the script he laid out in his first book and contributed a new level of analysis. Secret History reeks of an author who pumps out a second book to build on the success of the previous work while providing stale insight. It continues his travelogue of rape and pillage capitalism with more sex, exotic locations and people, and dubious historic claims. His vision of American history is cloudy and, at times, wrong. He embraces the mythology of the Revolution for the purposes of drawing a distinction between his utopian vision of government and the current nature of domestic and international policy. I don't know where or how he settled on the conclusion that President Dwight Eisenhower acquiesced to anyone to oppose the British, French, and Israeli aggression against Israel. The transparent historical record disproves that wild-eyed claim, as well as others on the Middle East. (We never invaded Iraq twice, which he struggles understanding.) Then there's his prose and structure. The book is clunking and poorly edited. For instance: it's disdain not distain as he uses it; one loses a job, not looses; scorporatocracy is not a word, whereas corporatocracy is. Those three examples are the ones that I noted, but the book was not limited to those few instances. Too many chapters are inchoate missives that often fail to offer more than glimpses of ideas without fully developing them or tying them in a cogent manner to larger themes.

One of my primary complaints is that there's a larger question he nearly touches, but neglects to address. For all his pleading to reform American business practices and international capitalism, he doesn't propose an alternate vision that will improve the plight of developing countries. Is it feasible to reform American corporations while allowing them to maintain their hegemony? My guess is no, which begs the question of who or what will replace our titans of capitalism? The US launched a global campaign at the turn of the 19th century to spread its version of commerce and business arrangements, and I doubt anyone would say that the mission was a failure. In fact, one could argue that the story of the 20th century is how American policy makers convinced the rest of the world to adopt its economic structures and order. Due to that, however, it's foolish to believe that weakening American companies to make them less profit oriented would convince similar entities to pursue the same strategy. Capitalism is a no holds barred game and reforming the Americans doesn't guarantee that Chinese or another state's corporations won't take advantage of weakness and exploit the channels dug by Bechtel, Halliburton, etc. If Perkins wants to recast the function as well as form of the US business and economic practices, I applaud his efforts, no matter how fruitless I find them. I simply would not turn to his books as guides.

Friday, September 4, 2009

Matthew B. Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft


Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work, 2009.

The University of Chicago tradition of training scholars is alive and well, as Matthew Crawford's book demonstrates as he bends and dips between an esoteric philosophical exegesis on labor and his gear head biography. I doubt he would react in anger with the latter description of his book. Indeed, one of the goals of this little book (clocking in at 210 pages on such a nuanced topic) is advocating for the restoration of trade-based education, even if the skill does not determine a person's occupation.

Crawford borrows on Martin Heidegger and a slew of other philosophers to examine what "work" or "labor" consists of today as well as in the past. Stepping back to the scientific management of Frederick Winslow Taylor, in short order he traces the contours of American labor history before slicing apart contemporary jobs that departed from a skill-based profession. Knowing a skill or trade is not only lucrative, it restores agency and infuses our lives with meaning. Unlike his deadening job as an abstract writer or the head of a DC think tank, repairing motorcycles infused his life with purpose in the recognizable way that he hears in the motorcycles he fixed or the jocular rapport of a work shop. A culture that glorifies report card As and the knowledge worker is one of his principle enemies, and he persuasively explains why they've generated nothing more than people who fashion hollow products such as a grade or a promotion.

I'm stuck wondering if this work is dialectical or a simple exploration of a dichotomy. He achieves his goal of explaining why we should restore shop class to the nation's education portfolio. In doing so, he rescues mechanics and the working-class from an economy and learning environment that privileges the knowledge worker as the highest plain of professions. He picks that argument apart and reveals its bankruptcy, partially with his own story of being employed as a knowledge worker. He doesn't romanticize working, rather he celebrates the opportunities it brings to learn about yourself and the way of the world.

Now on to the problems. I find myself agreeing with Crawford rather than disagreeing, so my complaints don't target his argument. In fact, I know plenty of people who would agree with this book if he stated his thesis simply. This isn't a simple book. It's a philosophical treatment of labor and the value it instills. The prose is chalky at points and he veers a bit before arriving at a conclusion. It wasn't an easy read, despite the limited page count, so I think it bears questioning who is the audience? If he is reaching out to middle-class parents who want nothing more than their children to succeed and have fewer professional options than to send their kids off to college, then his approach is troubled.

Finally, for all the negative comments on academia and knowledge workers, Crawford is a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia. I believe he still runs his motorcycle shop, and everyone needs to find gainful employment to survive so I don't think this smacks of hypocrisy. Nevertheless, he's gone back to the warm waters of academia that tend to shelter rather than an expose one to the unpredictable employment winds of working-class life.

My criticisms aside, his general elevation of trade based learning and professions is well argued, even if I question its accessibility. It certainly isn't for light reading and shouldn't be a vacation book.

Saturday, August 8, 2009

Reviews of Naomi Klein The Shock Doctrine and Jon Jeter Flat Broke in the Free Market

(mea culpa: I can't always guarantee that these reviews, or any post for that matter, will be written to the best of my abilities.)

Naomi Klein,
The Shock Doctrine: Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 2007.

Jon Jeter, Flat Broke in the Free Market: How Globalization Fleeced Working People, 2009.

When Kate and I traipsed around Ecuador and Peru on our ill-fated honeymoon, I recall a conversation we had in
Puno, Peru. Our trips aren't extravagant and our accommodations usually fall on the bottom scale of the budget traveler. (Of course, one could say that decisions such as that lead one to contract a nasty stomach illness that can effectively ruin a honeymoon.) Anyway, we pondered whether we helped or hurt with our travel. After rolling through the vapid glitz of Lima and taking several tourist trips, we both questioned the nature of our travel. For me, it was an issue that bothered me on another level as I helped a company outsource segments of its business. (For the record, the owner of the company has kept Kate and I eating and paying rent and my boss has been incredibly generous to me for the past six years.)

Naomi Klein's weighty book tackles some of these various issues. Clocking in at 460 pages, it's a commitment as she takes you through the battlefields of neoliberalism that left various third world economies cratered and reeling. The Shock Doctrine is exhaustive, to the point that this reviewer was forced to skim at an accelerated pace to conquer the often unskimmable paragraphs. I wanted to enjoy this book. If one of her goals was to chronicle the abuses stemming from the imposition of neoliberal economic development, then she succeeded handily. Nevertheless, I have problems with her use of terminology (especially the term corporatist), the relative absence of the US labor movement and working-class, and her proclivity for marrying the concepts of physical torture (electro shock) with economic counterrevolution (Milton Friedman’s “shock treatment”).

I'm no acolyte of Milton Friedman, and I feel that if you don't question the Friedmanite primacy given to markets then you're not paying attention. That being said,
Milton Friedman nor, I would argue, the Chicago Boys convinced a military thug such as Pinochet and others to unleash harsh waves of terror. Possibly the US government did, but that blurs the line of agency and the documentary record on these subjects tends to portray the US as players who acquiesced from the sidelines. (The CIA records aren’t released and I’m not in the business of speculating. Al McCoy is better suited for that task.) She could be stronger if she imposed a clearer vision of corporatism and painted less of a relationship between torture and economic shock therapy. She strays from the torture-shock treatment analogy as she progresses through the book, nevertheless, I think it's a flawed premise. Can't one say that communist revolutions or counterrevolutions imposed economic systems that proved equally as disastrous? The answer is yes, and she legitimizes that line of argumentation. Then the question revolves around revolutions and economics.

If that's the problematic aspect, Klein's clear strength lies in charting how neoliberalism failed to lift all boats. Those who benefited remain the developed states and multi-national corporations. Starting with Richard Nixon, neoliberalism became a pillar of American foreign policy where it remains to this day. We associate market freedom with political freedom, and, as she points out, that logic is severely flawed. This book isn't for beginners, however, and I wouldn't recommend it unless someone had a passionate interest in comprehending the economic beliefs that hobbled developing countries and peoples and led us to this current economic malaise.

Jon Jeter's thinner and equally interesting Flat Broke in the Free Market picks apart neoliberalism from a different methodological stance. Jeter traveled to Africa, Latin America, and in the US interviewing those who toil under neoliberalism's false promises to illustrate how working-class folk suffer under the weight of neoliberalism at home and abroad. The interviews provide a fascinating texture that Klein often overlooks, which is understandable. Beginning with a story of a Kenyan woman whose daily life seems to mirror Alexander Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich as the woman tries to sell tomatoes in a desperate bid to survive and feed her children.

Jeter's interviews span the working-class spectrum, everything from the aforementioned tomato seller to prostitutes in Latin America to the folks in the urban renewal group Imagine Englewood If. They allow him to paint the stunning, yet desolate, experiences of the poor that point to no signs of bettering any time soon. Many of the struggles gravitate toward basic necessities--water, safety/security, food, shelter--and work. Not to trivialize his book, but his dedication is one of the more touching ones I've read in this literature. He dedicates the book to those poor who desire to see the ocean. I can't do it justice here, so I won't try and you'll have to trust me on this one.

What would a review be without criticism? First, his fawning praise of Hugo Chavez at the book's close seems romantic and utopian. Second, Asia and Europe are completely absent. Nevertheless, a work can't do everything and I think it's a minor quibble. Third, often his analysis is lost in the midst of the stories and the reader often has to unpack some of what he might try to argue. Fourth, who's responsible here? Who are the agents? Often the guilty parties are Western companies and the US government that employ a neoliberal framework. I think it's
dubious to not judge states as sharing the blame for leveling their countries' economies and social structures, but they largely are absent as players who make the decisions. Even though the economic aspect does, as Jeter maintains, demonstrate a new lever of neocolonialism, I find his treatment of agency and responsibility slippery and sloppy.

So what? What do these books tell us? I guarantee that read back-to-back Klein and Jeter don't line one up for an uplifting experience. The culprit remains Friedman and his obsession with free markets that Western governments pushed since the early 1970s, with the clear victim being those in the US and the poor spread out in the world. What can be done? After finishing these two books I have my doubts if this edifice (with such considerable scaffolding in academia, government, and the private sector) can be demolished. This month's Adbusters addresses these questions. Still, I am uncertain if an equitable form of trade and economics will arise from our current economic contraction. Is there a way out of neoliberalism? I hope so, because as both of these books reveal, far too many people suffer for an economic ideology that benefits so few.

Sunday, June 28, 2009

Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World

I finished skimming Zakaria's Post-American World. He offers a few stinging criticisms of the US and domestic and foreign policy decisions, but one leaves the book with a positive impression on the US and its role in the future. China and India will overtake the US, he argues, and the US, nevertheless, will remain an sizable international figure economically, politically, and as a beacon for the world. Zakaria, an immigrant from India, offers a fascinating perspective as one who emigrated with high hopes for a new life in the US, and those impressions have not dulled in twenty years. In fact--as he lists the ways China, India, and the "rest" will rise over the US and generate a multi-polar world--he notes specific unique cultural values (e.g. critical thinking in schools, spectacular higher education, and entrepreneurial spirit) and demographic strength that separates the US from the surging "rest" will allow it to remain a virile state in the future.

For a reader who spends his or her time staring blankly into books or obsessing over blogs, much of this material won't break new ground. Zakaria's final chapter, "American Purpose," lists policy prescriptions addressing how the US can remedy the recent poor policy directions and systemic economic issues plaguing the US. The author points to a less hypocritical diplomacy and one based less on expansionism and exceptionialism as keys for the US to remain the central broker for international affairs. He correctly insists that the US model of capitalism is winning the world over. I'm not so sure about his claim that the style of government is taking hold everywhere. Still, the final chapter is one of the better and thought-provoking.

Of course, I have problems with specifics and larger themes, and the criticisms are interrelated. Like Thomas Friedman, Zakaria thinks big and examines overarching themes with glimpses of nuance interspersed in the text. Additionally, like Friedman, Zakaria misses the human element and skirts the negative effects of globalization, development, rising, or whatever one wants to dub the adherence to the neoliberal model. When colonialism or exploitative capitalism, American or European, appears it does so ephemerally without any exploration of how it ravaged countries in the past or present. In other words, he neglects to balance the negative with the positive in his effusive lauding of American free market capitalism and globalization. And why not? Negativity doesn't sell books or spread your views on the future from outside of policy circles to the reading public.

I won't snip at him for commenting on the dispossession of farmers in eastern India, thanks in part to the local communist party, for a Nano car plant. (OK, maybe I will a little bit.) At this point, it's difficult to read The Post-American World positively. My assumption is that President Obama's foreign policy meets his desires, for the most part. Despite his prescience on a variety of issues, one cannot fault him for failing to predict the pits of this global recession. He casts off the abysmal household savings rate, credit card debt, mortgages, health care, and poor American economic practices. I would guess that he would rescind those statements. Still, the glossy, cheerful forecasts don't seem as bright, even if the US can right the ship and rein in the rampant foolhardy capitalism practiced in the US in favor of a sustainable vision for the country that partners oversight and ample encouragement for innovation and invention.

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Ernest May, long-time American and international historian at Harvard since 1959, dies at 80.

Ernie May, who taught at Harvard for 55 years, is the intellectual father of countless American foreign relations and international historians, not to mention the European historians and political scientists he taught at the John F. Kennedy School. May was a long-time faculty member and administrator who remained active and whose imprint continued on newly minted PhDs within the past year or two. Methodologically, May encouraged students to think outside the comings and goings in the halls of Foggy Bottom and the White House, and to examine international events as well as public opinion and smaller actors. On top of that, he was an extremely nice guy (from everything I've read and heard), which isn't always a given at academic powerhouses like Harvard or in academia in general.

Ernie May, 1928-2009

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961

I finally completed my skim of Christina Klein's Cold War Orientalism. I bought the book two years ago and never read it for a class with my adviser on the state of the field (US foreign relations history). This won't be a long, drawn-out review like the others. Klein, a professor of English at Boston College, examines cultural artifacts (such as Reader's Digest, Saturday Review, The Ugly American, "The King and I," and others) to chart how producers of knowledge endeavored to destroy barriers that separated the US from Asia. Klein highlights how authors and playrights engaged in a liberal program to link the US to Asia to foster support for the Cold War through the creation of sentimental books, articles, tracts, plays, and films.

Klein's introduction lays out her improvement on Edward Said's concept of Orientalism. Similar to Melani McAlister, she argues that the American variant isn't as strict as the European form Said first chronicled. Her focus on the sentimental revealed how middlebrow Americans "must be seen...as working through a logic of affiliation as well as through one of difference" (16). Her treatment of this throughout the book is well done and contributes a much-needed level of nuance to the US' interactions with the developing world after 1945. I am left to wonder, however, if one can trace the genesis of a particularly American brand of Orientalism without first discussing whiteness and the concept of race and races prior to 1945. By doing so, it would shed light on the steps by which foreign others were categorized and placed in a hierarchy of races. The American notion of whiteness itself was fluid prior to the 1920s and never as simple as seeing non-white people as the Other. I also believe that concepts of Orientalism cannot be divorced from material culture or production in a longer view of American history.

I also wonder about her use of the term middlebrow. She never articulates who was the target for this cultural output. Of course, the immediate response is to say, "hey, dummy, it's middlebrow. Get it?" But American conceptions of class and what was middle-class went through significant shifts following the Second World War. I have some doubts about the widespread acceptance and viewing of the products she interprets by a steel worker in Pittsburgh or an oil worker in Kansas. Do you think they were dog earring their copies of William Lederer's and Eugene Burdick's The Ugly American? While that audience could be considered low brow, that is somewhat at odds with American history and class relations at that time. I also have questions regarding the long-term effect of "The King and I" and how one could illustrate the permanence of the ideas expressed in the representations she analyzes.

As a final critique, there are points where I tire when reading about Oscar Hammerstein, James Michener, Norman Cousins, Thomas Dooley, etc. Certainly, it feeds her analysis and is relevant for her argument, but I found myself skimming those sections speedily and with no remorse for the oversight.

Monday, April 13, 2009

Review of Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East

Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East, 2009.

Faculty profile at Columbia

Khalidi, the Edward Said Professor of Modern Middle East Studies at Columbia, gained nation-wide attention in the fall after Fox news linked the insidious Khalidi to Obama. He is one of the, if not the, leading scholars on the modern Middle East teaching in the US. Sowing Crisis examines the role of the Cold War on the Middle East, which he also addressed in Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East (2004). This work resulted from lectures at Bryn Mawr and a spate of institutions from Alexandria, Egypt to Tufts, and it blends sources from monographs, published primary sources (notably FRUS), and on-line document store-houses, such as the National Security Archive. The book consists of six mixed thematic and chronological chapters examining the roots of the US' policy in the Middle East and the deleterious effects of its Cold War agenda.

If someone asked me to recommend a book for non-specialists on US policy in the region, I would consider this one of the two recommended works. If a person wanted a detailed explanation of how the US acted in the region, Douglas Little's American Orientalism is considered the standard book by an American historian. Little's scholarship, at points, is an accomplished diplomatic history under Edward Said's guiding thought of orientalism. One could argue that outside of a theoretical framework specified in the first chapter, orientalism is loosely applied. Little's prose, base of knowledge, and handle of documentary evidence and scholarship makes the book essential to a student of American policy in the region, and qualifies him as one of the leading diplomatic historians of US policy in the region.

What you get from Khalidi is different. Where Little tends to stand back and let the cards fall where they may, Khalidi judges the nature of policy and assesses how super-power rivalry interfered with regional politics. He offers a generalized view of the US' actions in the region and global events during the Cold War peppered with specific details, which is no surprise considering that each chapter is an adapted lecture. Starting with the importance of Iran and oil, he moves through the 20th century up until the War on Terror, which he considers more of a war on Muslims and the Middle East rather than a true war on terrorism. US policy in the region, the author maintains, stemmed from Cold War justifications and, after 1979, decisions to oppose Iran. He incorporates Odd Arne Westad's conception of the US as an empire of liberty in The Global Cold War, and Khalidi discerns few traces of spreading liberty to the Middle East in American policy. Similarly, viewing the Soviet Union as an empire of justice, he argues that the Soviet presence accomplished little in purveying equality for the working-class or downtrodden fellahin.

Khalidi moves into the post-Cold War era with a predominant focus on GW Bush. As one could guess, Khalidi points to the Bush administration and war as unhinging Iraq and producing regional instability--unrivaled in the US' history of meddling since 1945. He justly criticizes Bush and his team for failing to comprehend not only elemental facts on Iraq, but of regional history. Khalidi's treatment of the period following 1991 centers mostly on the 2003 invasion, and there's a noticeable administration missing. Bill Clinton's continuous punitive measures targeting Iraq (better known as limited or quiet war for nearly all of his presidency) escape notice except for a few oblique references, and Khalidi elides nearly everything after the momentarily successful Madrid peace meeting until 2003.

After skimming the book, I'm left with several other criticisms. Khalidi repeats several items, which isn't a deal breaker considering the book's scope. He also claims, erroneously, that Dwight Eisenhower won the presidency after "Truman's defeat in the 1952 elections" (172). Adlai Stevenson--the Democratic Party's two time loser in the 50s--ran against Ike, not Truman. There are two other interpretive matters that I wish Khalidi would have expanded or addressed. The first relates to oil. The second chapter elucidates the significance of oil for the US and its allies after WWII, but it stops without developing the point further or how petroleum could have influenced US decision making after 1950. After the second chapter, oil disappears as a matter that drove policy. What about Operation Hard Surface and supporting the Saudi state with weapons? Could he have covered the US' interactions with the Shah's Savak? While this wasn't his book, it raises questions on the American century and the black gold that greased the wheels of American hegemony. Specifically, one could ask, could there have been such an expansive American century (abroad and at home) without cheap oil?

Lastly, to borrow a line from the Godfather, American policy in the region wasn't all dollars and cents. Certainly, the Cold War guided the US' actions in the region, but other aspects were at play. Shifting perceptions of Jews following the 1967 war altered US relations; it wasn't simply Cold War politics, as Peter Novick shows in The Holocaust and Collective Memory. The elephant in the room, orientalism, a topic which Khalidi is no stranger to, appears a handful of times. There are two potential explanations. One, that intellectual terrain is a mine field, and he was wise to avoid it at all costs. By doing so, he steers clear of attacks of being anti-semitic. The second results from his overarching framework. He attributes American foreign policy processes to Cold War reasoning, which is correct, but he misses the cultural motives of policy, such as deep seated enmity of Arabs. My money is on the former--he's too good of an historian to make that mistake.

Those criticisms aside, it's a wonderful book for someone who wants to grasp the motors of American foreign relations in the Middle East and how they influenced the state of the region's politics.

Here's a quote I enjoyed and that I find summarizes much of his analysis for the Cold War:
"While these remarks provoke several reflections about the Middle East since the end of the Cold War--a period that has seen a massive upsurge in US interest in the region keyed to terrorism than communism--one reflection is pertinent to this chapter: how much harm to the internal political development of this region, and in particular to peoples' aspirations for democracy, was done by the two superpowers' obsessive focus on each other, sometimes to the exclusion of all else, and their constant, insidious jockeying for Cold War advantage? The evidence of Iran, or Lebanon and Jordan, and also of Iraq and other countries in the region is that it was grave." (200)

Sunday, April 5, 2009

James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan

James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War, 2009.

James Mann's 2004 Rise of the Vulcans placed him as one of the leading popular voices covering recent American foreign relations history, and Mann's Rebellion continues the trend. In Rebellion Mann argues that Ronald Reagan bucked traditional conservative thinking on Gorbachev and the state of the Soviet Union, and helped end the Cold War. Instead of viewing Gorbachev through the doctrinaire prism of a velvet glove hiding a steel fist ready to crush capitalism and democracy, Dutch realized Gorbachev's fundamental desire to initiate true reform on several fronts, which permitted Gorbachev to enact perestroika and glasnost. Ultimately, Mann concludes:

"Reagan didn't win the Cold War; Gorbachev abandoned it. By recognizing Gorbachev's significance, when many others in the US did not, Reagan helped create the climate in which the Cold War could end." (346)

Mann lays out the challenges Reagan faced internationally and from within the US, including his own dogmatic anti-communism. At points, the book reads like a greatest hits of the Reagan presidency, skipping through the well-worn narrative of events and speeches. The chapters are short and portray events through a speedy, episodic chronology, but the brief nature also tends to increase repitition until parts III and IV. In orther words, the first half is breezy.

That's not to say that the book isn't without substance. Mann goes a long way in debunking the Republican and conservative mythology surrounding Reagan. Mann portrays Dutch as a simple person: a man influenced by his wife; a president who grasped larger ideas but lacked any interest in nuance; and one who made mistakes and gaffes, especially as Alzheimer's Disease reared its head in the final year (or years) of his presidency. The romantic idea of "Reagan" as the Republican paragon is crucial for the Republican Party. Don't get me wrong, Dutch played an important role in demolishing the New Deal alignment of political loyalties and altering how people talked about the place of government, even if their actions didn't mirror rhetoric. (I think that's one of the most valuable legacies of Reagan's presidency, altering the language of the debate on government.) Of course, he didn't shrink government, he exploded the US deficit, and, after seeing the effect of his tax cuts, raised taxes to compensate for his budgets. But if you have any doubts about Reagan's symbolic importance, revisit the imagery and discussion during the 2008 Republican primary and general election campaign.

I learned more about the interaction between Reagan, Nixon, and Kissinger than I knew before, but it points to my strongest criticism. Nixon visited Reagan and sent him letters as Reagan sought the ashamed president's approval for his foreign policy. The Soviets also contacted Nixon for advice on how they should deal with Reagan. Mann uses the interactions with Nixon to symbolize how rebellious Reagan's interactions with Gorbachev were. In many ways, the difference of opinion--continuing throughout Reagan's shift in favor of Gorbachev--serves as the vehicle by which Mann characterizes Republican thinking on the Soviet Union. This, however, is problematic. Mann offers sprinklings of opposition from Buckley, Will, Safire, and the WSJ, but I'm left wondering how "rebellious" Reagan's policy was from mainstream thought? Intellectually, I grasp Mann's point, however, I don't know how well it holds up to the historical record or basic critique. Presidents working with their Soviet counterparts wasn't revolutionary. (See Jeremy Suri's Power and Protest on this point.)

Additionally, how can you be an upstart if you're opposing Nixon but refusing to acknowledge his presence and keeping your meetings and communications entirely secret due to the stigma attached to the shamed ex-president? What was Reagan rejecting? Nixon's and Kissinger's detente? Reagan ran against detente and purposely avoided any language that linked his actions to detente, which was widely unpopular by 1980. So what or who is he rebelling against? Overall, I think Mann exaggerates Reagan's rejection of Cold War orthodoxy, especially since Reagan symbolized it for decades before 1980. (Thanks for the input, Doug.) Finally, the issue of evolution in Reagan's thinking is skimpy and seems forced in Mann's hurry to paint Reagan as rebellious.

Regarding the latter points, Mann wrote the book for a popular audience. A scholarly study of this sort would need to factor in public opinion, congressional opposition, and influence of world leaders. Mann includes some congressional opposition to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987 and 1988. The focus is on Reagan, but Gorbachev occassionaly seems like a side player or someone who reacts to Reagan's initiatives rather than an agent of his own. I find that treatment odd considering the sub-title and the prominence Mann awards Gorbachev for ending the Cold War. Nevertheless, for a popular audience the book isn't bad. It offers factual interpretations (instead of "REAGAN WON THE COLD WAR" mythology), the writing is lucid, and Mann provides a conceptual framework that popular historians have largely eschewed.

Friday, February 6, 2009

Review of Jana Lipman, Guantanamo: A Working-Class History Between Empire and Revolution, 2008

(I wrote this book review nearly a month ago, and I don't have the interest in editing it.)

Jana Lipman. Guantanamo: A Working-Class History Between Empire and Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. If you're curious about my pointless gripes, go to the last two paragraphs.

The welter of recent discussions on Guantanamo Bay and enemy combatants overshadows the long history of the US' presence in Cuba and, in some ways, clouds what Jana Lipman refers to as the base's neocolonial presence. Lipman examines the military installation and its relationship with base workers living in nearby Guantanamo City. She contends that the base's history is inextricable from discussions of labor with Cubans and argues "
that the base workers are critical to the evolution of the base" (5). More importantly for me, and something I couldn't agree with more, she comments that "social history is diplomatic history and that local and international histories meet on the ground" (5-6). My work will examine foreign relations history as social history, so her methodological approach intrigues me most.

Lipman blends
base workers' oral history, Cuban newspapers, and research in the Cuban archives with traditional American diplomatic and some labor sources. Her reach and ability to weave these fascinating sources is compelling. I may have some issues with the book, but I am impressed with her collection of first-hand accounts and Cuban sources. As one of my advisers asked with amazement when discussing the book during the DH editorial meeting "how did she do that?"

Lipman charts the progression from 1898 to the present in a cogent linear progression. She notes that most histories neglect the base, and, in so doing, ignore the post-1898 story until Castro's seizure of power from Batista and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The base workers navigated difficult straits as they sought to organize as the base's prominence expanded during and after WWII. Work on the base was lucrative and provided security and a comfortable livelihood, but after 1960 working on the base grew difficult as the US and Cuba collided. After 1963, Cuban and American security searches forced workers to strip, walk naked between zones, and suffer other indignities to continue working on the base. Cold War differences boiled over in 1964 and--although some laborers continued their itinerant status--most workers were given the choice of quitting for Cuba or turning their backs on Cuba to labor and live only in the base. Since, various contractors and Caribbean workers, notably Jamaicans, filled the majority of the jobs.

Quite simply, there's a lot to like about this book. Her narrative is fluid, she weaves the sources clearly, and it's an impressive work. I'm curious to see how her book fares in the prize circuit, and I wouldn't be surprised if she wins an AHA or OAH award. At the least, I think the book should be considered for SHAFR's Bernath Prize.

I skimmed the book in a less thorough manner than I should have. So the following questions or problems might have been dealt with in a more convincing manner than I caught. The description of labor at times was a bit thin for my taste. Lipman stresses the international nature of this labor exchange process. At points, however, I'm left wondering if it might be more accurately described as transnational. She treats the issue in the introduction, but I'm not wholly convinced. Similarly, I'm wondering if there is a story of migration and labor in the Caribbean that's absent. That subject is broached as West Indian workers appear early in the book, fades, and then is somewhat reestablished with the introduction of Jamaican workers after '65. Is this a legacy of colonialism or neocolonialism in the region's labor relations and part of a broader story? I wouldn't realistically expect her to issue grandiose claims and stretch herself too thin. Still, I think there are connections she could have drawn.

I prefer not to criticize an author for a book s/he didn't write. As I finished the book, I'm left wondering about neocolonialism and neoliberalism and what Lipman's book tells about those issues. Migration, labor, and capital are tied together in this story and I think it's a marker of a good book to leave one with productive questions.