Think tanks and
administrations have a
traditionally porous border, which in and of itself isn't too surprising considering the nature of policy experts in think tanks such as
Heritage,
Cato,
Brookings,
Council on Foreign Relations, and the newly formed
Center for a New American Security.
CNAS, formed in 2007, is picking up some of my favorite
bloggers and assembling them into an exciting institution:
Abu Muqawama and now they poached
Marc Lynch from foreign policy. They've assembled a fine list of experts and academics in this fledgling
organization that has
sent its members to the Obama administration.
CNAS is known for fancying counter insurgency (COIN) theory and warfare as it plays out in the
laboratories of Iraq and Afghanistan, and focuses on Asia and the Middle East. I'm curious to see what they produce and if they can survive in the long-term.
As one could expect, Andrew
Bacevich, one of favorite
contemporary thinkers and historians, is moving in similar circles even though his message rejects the Bush and Obama
administrations' diplomacy and direction, and he seems wary of any approach that treats COIN as a panacea. Rob at
Arabic Media Shack condensed
Bacevich's recent
LAT op-ed "
Obama's Strategic Blind Spot" and his several points that center on one aspect: there is no change in strategy, rather one in tactics that avoids
reevaluating America's role in the world.
Bacevich's "
Best Intentions: An Appreciation of Graham Greene" in
World Affairs is also
enlightening, sharp read. According to the folks at
The American Conservative,
Bacevich's recent talk at a
CNAS event
leveled the crowd with the lack of his
triumphalist COIN glossolalia and his advice that the US should lessen its
international prominence. As you can guess, he apparently was the
contrarian who spoke
uncomfortable truths that didn't jive with the tenor of previous discussions on how COIN is going to save the world. I should mention that I have some doubts about
TAC's reporting and how their bias influencs their conclusions on CNAS considering they exist on opposite sides of the political aisle.
I don't think of
Bacevich as an historian who mines archives, sifting through dusty
memcons and
telcons for the truth of the matter. His works investigate
contemporary or recent history. As I've posted before,
Bacevich is an acolyte of William
Appleman Williams, Charles and Mary Beard, and what is referred to as the Progressive School in foreign policy history and American history. So it was no surprise that
Bacevich wrote the
introduction to the newest edition of Williams'
Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Despite my extreme admiration for
Bacevich and his work, I don't know that policy
retrenchment or shrinking is the solution nor is it compatible for
international affairs. Who will take over the US' role as
hegemon? Could chaos ensue? Who is going to guarantee that
Wienerschnitzel remains one of the strongest multi-national corporations?
The US needs the world, but the worlds needs the US even if the
Bretton Woods order is dead and the American security umbrella is in a poor state. Before
Bacevich espoused his grand dream for a
conservative (in the true sense of the word) diplomacy and military role, another historian advocated for a similar tack. Michael H. Hunt--emeritus professor of American foreign relations history at the University of North Carolina--rejected American
gallavanting in the wake of Vietnam. In an afterword to the newest edition of his classic
Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Hunt admits that he was wrong.
The US is not implicated in world affairs in such a deep and complex fashion that a retreat is hard to imagine and if attempted might produce dire consequences overseas, notably a breakdown of global integration, with international anarchy a likely prospect. Moreover, an assertive US nationalism is so important in providing social glue for a diverse, mobile people that a repudiation of the country's leading role on the international stage might well prove deeply divisive at home and spawn bitter cries of betrayal. Finally, pressing domestic problems are now inextricably entangled with international trends and pressures, ranging from climate change to global finance and trade to resource scarcity to immigrant pressures generated by failed states and stagnant economies. (216)
So what are we to do? The US could afford to drop its military adventures, as everyone
acknowledges, and it should welcome the rise of a multi-polar world while encouraging allied states and easing immigration standards. In the long run, the US
needs a positive birth rate for the country to remain thriving. It's an uneasy fact, but it's true, folks. Diplomacy is a zero-sum game, but that doesn't mean we can't make way for the rise of equal powers, especially if the US wishes to preserve a legacy of its worldview even if there are serious contradictions and dilemmas inherent to neo-liberalism or neo-conservatism.