As one could expect, Andrew Bacevich, one of favorite contemporary thinkers and historians, is moving in similar circles even though his message rejects the Bush and Obama administrations' diplomacy and direction, and he seems wary of any approach that treats COIN as a panacea. Rob at Arabic Media Shack condensed Bacevich's recent LAT op-ed "Obama's Strategic Blind Spot" and his several points that center on one aspect: there is no change in strategy, rather one in tactics that avoids reevaluating America's role in the world. Bacevich's "Best Intentions: An Appreciation of Graham Greene" in World Affairs is also enlightening, sharp read. According to the folks at The American Conservative, Bacevich's recent talk at a CNAS event leveled the crowd with the lack of his triumphalist COIN glossolalia and his advice that the US should lessen its international prominence. As you can guess, he apparently was the contrarian who spoke uncomfortable truths that didn't jive with the tenor of previous discussions on how COIN is going to save the world. I should mention that I have some doubts about TAC's reporting and how their bias influencs their conclusions on CNAS considering they exist on opposite sides of the political aisle.
I don't think of Bacevich as an historian who mines archives, sifting through dusty memcons and telcons for the truth of the matter. His works investigate contemporary or recent history. As I've posted before, Bacevich is an acolyte of William Appleman Williams, Charles and Mary Beard, and what is referred to as the Progressive School in foreign policy history and American history. So it was no surprise that Bacevich wrote the introduction to the newest edition of Williams' Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Despite my extreme admiration for Bacevich and his work, I don't know that policy retrenchment or shrinking is the solution nor is it compatible for international affairs. Who will take over the US' role as hegemon? Could chaos ensue? Who is going to guarantee that Wienerschnitzel remains one of the strongest multi-national corporations?
The US needs the world, but the worlds needs the US even if the Bretton Woods order is dead and the American security umbrella is in a poor state. Before Bacevich espoused his grand dream for a conservative (in the true sense of the word) diplomacy and military role, another historian advocated for a similar tack. Michael H. Hunt--emeritus professor of American foreign relations history at the University of North Carolina--rejected American gallavanting in the wake of Vietnam. In an afterword to the newest edition of his classic Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Hunt admits that he was wrong.
The US is not implicated in world affairs in such a deep and complex fashion that a retreat is hard to imagine and if attempted might produce dire consequences overseas, notably a breakdown of global integration, with international anarchy a likely prospect. Moreover, an assertive US nationalism is so important in providing social glue for a diverse, mobile people that a repudiation of the country's leading role on the international stage might well prove deeply divisive at home and spawn bitter cries of betrayal. Finally, pressing domestic problems are now inextricably entangled with international trends and pressures, ranging from climate change to global finance and trade to resource scarcity to immigrant pressures generated by failed states and stagnant economies. (216)So what are we to do? The US could afford to drop its military adventures, as everyone acknowledges, and it should welcome the rise of a multi-polar world while encouraging allied states and easing immigration standards. In the long run, the US needs a positive birth rate for the country to remain thriving. It's an uneasy fact, but it's true, folks. Diplomacy is a zero-sum game, but that doesn't mean we can't make way for the rise of equal powers, especially if the US wishes to preserve a legacy of its worldview even if there are serious contradictions and dilemmas inherent to neo-liberalism or neo-conservatism.
2 comments:
"Despite my extreme admiration for Bacevich and his work, I don't know that policy retrenchment or shrinking is the solution nor is it compatible for international affairs. Who will take over the US' role as hegemon? Could chaos ensue? Who is going to guarantee that Wienerschnitzel remains one of the strongest multi-national corporations?"
This seems to be a common response to non-interventionists, yet seems to miss a very simple distinction: it IS possible to maintain economic and relatively neutral dimplomatic relations with the nations of the world, without taking on the role of being the world's policeman. Indeed, if nations realize they are responsible (and not us) for their success, they may exercise more wisdom and restraint in their relations with their neighbors.
Finally, and with respect, I must say your statement on 'chaos ensuing' strikes me as either very patronizing or ill-informed. We are not Atlas, with the weight of the world on our back.
Peace be with you.
Thanks for the comment, Chris. I don't read them very often since my impression is that very few people read my blog.
Since we don't know each other, you aren't familiar with my admittedly odd sense of humor. The "could chaos ensue" remark related mostly to the subsequent and joking clause about Wienerschnitzel, which is not the strongest MNC but my favorite fast food hot dog chain where my family ate during my childhood visits to my step-grandparents' home.
Of course, one could argue that the foundation of the Bretton Woods order--that still exists in a much-weakened state today--did, in fact, put the weight of the world on the US' shoulders, or that of its consumers and tax payers. As many economic forecasters point out, the revival of the US economy will commence any sort of global economic recovery.
I think you're right that nations should be responsible and independent of the US, but the weight of history doesn't support that nations will be responsible nor that we could have a more peaceful international system. I'm not contending that the world needs a liberal hegemon to function, but I also think it's a risky and utopian vision to advocate for a swift US withdrawal from its international commitment and roles in a sweeping fashion without some concern for the end product that could threaten US national security. I think it's silly for the US defense budget to rise astronomically while schools are poorly funded. The intertwining nature of defense and diplomacy, however, makes a slashing of the budget unlikely.
And, for what it's worth, who's to say that some countries don't want the US to maintain its role? Is it empire by invitation, as historian Geir Lundestad argues? American humanitarian, defense, economic, etc. aid comes with a price tag, of course, but most countries often request it, as the diplomatic record and history monographs reflect.
US foreign relations history isn't pretty and time after time we've been our own worst enemy based on wretched policy decisions. I can't, however, picture an international system where the US cedes its power. I think one must ask what shape it would take without certain states filling its shoes, and if US national security and commercial interests will necessarily be improved. (For the record, US capitalism and economic survival dictates that the US protect its commercial and neo-liberal interests. Whether I like it or not, that's a fact.) A tempered and slow withdrawal, as I commented on in the post, is, I believe, the best antidote to this dilemma.
That's not to say I'm right and you're wrong, and I appreciate the opportunity to respond. And, quite frankly, a confirmation that at least someone is reading this damned thing. I don't run analytics for several reasons, mostly due to fear of irrelevance.
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